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Constitutionality of New York City’s Health Regulations 
By: Richard Lyons 
Abstract 
The rapid rise in obesity has become a significant public health concern. As a growing 
number of adults and children suffer from this disease, health care professionals, as well as 
government bodies, have begun to intervene. Obesity leads to unsustainable increases in health 
care, and as a result, many states have attempted to pass regulations to control the epidemic. This 
article surveys the dominant factors that have been linked to obesity, as well as the potential 
health effects. The second part of the paper focuses on government intervention in New York 
City, which has played a prominent role in leading the nation in passing regulations as a 
proposed solution to slow the progression of this epidemic. Lastly in the third part, there have 
been a number of proposed federal constitutional challenges to the regulations imposed by New 
York City’s government. This section will outline out the arguments using previous 
jurisprudence on both sides and offer a predictive approach on how a court is likely to adjudicate 
these matters.  
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Introduction  
It is estimated that 95 million adults are overweight or obese in the United States. 
1
 
Studies conducted by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) indicate that over 
36% of adults over the age of 20 are classified as obese.
2
 More alarming is the fact that 17.1% of 
juveniles are classified as obese.
3
 The Center for Disease Control and Prevention defines obesity 
as an adult who has a body mass index (BMI) of 30 or higher.
4
 The standard example is a person 
who is 5 feet, 9 inches tall and weighing 203 pounds is classified as obese.
5
 As a leading public 
health concern within the United States that is showing no sign of decline, government agencies 
have pushed for intervention 
There are considerable health risks associated with obesity, including heart disease, type 
2 diabetes, hypertension, certain cancers, and increased risk of stroke.
6
 Obesity not only affects 
individuals, it also creates a shifting cost to the rest of society. The CDC estimates that medical 
costs resulting from obesity exceeded 147 billion dollars.
7
 Further, there are both direct and 
indirect costs associated with obesity. The direct costs are those such as medical expenses, 
including preventative, diagnostic, and treatment services.
8
 In addition, there are numerous 
indirect costs, which stem from the decreased productivity and restricted activities of those who 
are classified as obese.
9
 
Studies indicate there various factors which have been linked to the prevalence of 
obesity. For instance, obesity has been directly correlated with race. Studies indicate Mexican-
                                                        
1 DiPiro JT, Talbert RL, Yee GC, Matzke GR, Wells BG, Posey LM, eds. Pharmacotherapy: A Pathophysiologic Approach. 6th ed. New 
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2 US Department of Health and Human Services (US DHHS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for 
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American women and African-American women had the highest prevalence of obesity: 48.1 and 
49.1 percent, respectively.
10
 Furthermore, socioeconomic status is classified as the most 
prevalent factor in obesity. As a result of the relatively low cost and easily available fast food in 
the inner cities, consumption of high fat and sugar meals among the poor and working poor has 
skyrocketed. Studies show that 54.1 % of women with income below the poverty line suffer from 
obesity.
11
 It is commonly believed that packaged foods are more affordable than fresh natural 
ingredients, and this misconception has contributed to the obesity epidemic in the United States.  
Traditional government functions include protecting the public health and promoting 
public safety.
12
 As a result, many state and local jurisdictions have adopted regulations and laws 
to increase exercise and decrease consumption of potentially harmful products. On October 11
th
 
2012, the New Jersey Legislature passed Act 3441, which allows tax deductions for individuals 
who bike to work.
13
 The legislation notes that this method is an ideal solution to the need for 
moderate physical activity.
14
 Currently, there are considerable amounts of similar legislation 
being proposed and placed into law all across the United States. The most prominent area, and 
the first city, to establish multiple regulations designed to promote public health in light of the 
obesity epidemic is New York City. 
15
 
Overview of Trans Fat Regulation 
On December 5, 2006, the Board of Health approved amendment § 81.08 to Article 81 of 
the New York City Health Code to phase out artificial trans fat in all New York City restaurants 
and other food service establishments.
16
 The phase out of artificial trans fat in restaurant foods 
                                                        
10 DiPiro Pharmacotherapy: A Pathophysiologic Approach. 6th ed. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill; 2005:761. 
11 DiPiro Pharmacotherapy: A Pathophysiologic Approach. 6th ed. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill; 2005:761. At 2226 
12 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317 (2001)- 
13 N.J.S. 3441, 2012.  
14 Id. 
15 The Regulation to Phase Out Artificial Trans Fat In New York Food Service Establishments . Seen on:10/25/2012 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/cardio/cardio-transfat-bro.pdf 
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took effect in two stages.
17
 By July 1, 2007, New York City food service establishments were 
prohibited from using oils, shortening, and margarine containing artificial trans fat for frying or 
as a spread which would contain 0.5 grams or more of trans fat per serving. 
18
 Moreover, by July 
1, 2008, all foods must have less than 0.5 grams of trans fat per serving if they have any artificial 
trans fat.
19
 Packaged foods served in the manufacturer's original, sealed packaging are exempt 
from these regulations.
20
 
 In passing Amendment § 81.08, the legislation offered a considerable amount of findings, 
which directly related promulgation of the trans fat ban. Food service establishments are an 
important source of daily food intake for New York City residents. It is estimated that one third 
of daily caloric intake of the city’s residents comes from foods purchased in restaurants.21 
Therefore, assuring healthy dining options is an essential public health priority. Section 81.08 
was initiated to address the growing concerns surrounding the health of New York City residents 
by restricting trans fat in foods served in restaurants, which represents a dangerous, and 
preventable, health risk to restaurant goers.
22
 The goal of the regulation is that through the 
restriction of foods containing artificial trans fats from being served at food service 
establishments, there will be a reduction in New Yorkers’ exposure to food items that are heavily 
associated with increased heart disease risk. 
23
 
 From a public health standpoint, it was determined that New York City required 
                                                        
17  Bd. of Health, N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§81.08) to Article 81 of 
the New York City Health Code  (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-
art81-08.pdf  
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 The Regulation to Phase Out Artificial Trans Fat In New York Food Service Establishments 
21 Guthrie JF. et al. Role of Food Prepared Away from Home in the American Diet, 1977-78 Versus 1994-96: Changes and 
Consequences. Society for Nutrition Education 2002; 34:140-150. 
22 Bd. of Health, N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§81.08) 
23 Id.  
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intervention. Heart disease is classified as New York City’s leading cause of death.24  In 2004 
alone, over 23,000 New York City residents died from heart disease.
25
 More alarming is that 
nearly one-third of these individuals died before the age of 75.
26
 Medical experts have directly 
correlated increased trans fat intake with the risk of heart disease. With an estimated one third of 
dietary trans fat coming from foods purchased in restaurants, New York City health official 
became increasingly concerned with the prevalence of trans fat oil in restaurant foods.
27
 Trans fat 
essentially increases the risk of heart disease by elevating a person’s “bad” cholesterol, while at 
the same time, lowering “good” cholesterol.28 Due to trans fats negative effect on “good 
cholesterol”, it has a more destructive impact than saturated fat. The 2005 Dietary Guidelines for 
Americans, issued by the United States Department of Agriculture, recommends that dietary 
intake of trans fat be “as low as possible.”29 Similarly, the American Heart Association 
guidelines from 2006 recommend that trans fat intake be kept below 1% of total energy intake.
30
 
 It is estimated by New York City health officials that approximately 80% of dietary 
artificial trans fat is found in industrially produced, partially hydrated oils, which is used for 
frying, baking, and is prevalent in many processed foods.
31
 The Institute of Medicine firmly 
stated that there is no safe level of artificial trans fat consumption.
32
 In contrast, other dietary 
fats, when consumed in moderation, are a natural part of a healthy diet.
33
 The Institute of 
                                                        
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 NYC DOHMH, Office of Vital Statistics. NYC Vital Statistics 2004, Accessed on EpiQuery. 2006. 
27 Guthrie JF. et al. Role of Food Prepared Away from Home in the American Diet, 1977-78 Versus 1994-96: Changes and 
Consequences. Society for Nutrition Education 2002; 34:140-150. 
28 Ascherio A. Katan MB. Zock PL. Stampfer MJ. Willett WC. Trans fatty acids and coronary heart disease. New England Journal of 
Medicine. 1999; 340:1994-1998 
29 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee. King J, et al. Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2012. October 31 2012. 
http://www.health.gov/dietaryguidelines/dga2005/document/pdf/ExecutiveSummary.pdf 
30 American Heart Association Nutrition Committee. Lichtenstein, A. et al. Diet and lifestyle recommendations revision 2006: a 
scientific statement from the American Heart Association Nutrition Committee. Circulation. 2006 July 4;114(1)e27. 
31 http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2003/503_fats.html 
32 US Food and Drug Administration. Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient content Claims, and Health Claims (68 Fed. 
Reg. 41443 (July 11, 2003)) accessed on November 21 at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/fr03711a.html 
33 Id. 
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Medicine states that artificially produced trans fat offers no known health benefit.
34
 Because 
healthy, inexpensive alternatives exist for the most common source of trans fat, New York City 
health officials have determined that the use of artificial trans fats pose an unnecessary health 
threat to the public.
35
 
Overview of Menu Label Regulation  
In continuing with its goal of reducing obesity, New York City passed Amendment § 
81.50 to Article 81 of the New York City Health Code. Section 81.50 requires that on July 1
st
 
2007, food service establishments in New York City, which sell food items with standardized 
portions and contents, must display publicly available information about the calorie content of 
these items on menus and menu boards.
36
 The aims of the amendment are an effort to inform 
consumers about their nutritional choices at the time of purchase.
37
 Through the passage of 
section 81.50, New York City’s Board of Health has made considerable findings in support of 
this amendment.  
 New York City’s Board of Health is well aware that obesity is an epidemic. Amendment 
81.05, in its legislative findings, offers that, according to measured height and weight data from 
the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), the obesity rate among U.S. 
adults more than doubled over the past three decades from 14.5% in 1971-1974 to 32.2% in 
2003-2004.
38
 In New York City, more than half of adults are overweight, while one in six are 
obese.
39
 Obesity begins at an early age with nearly 21% of New York City kindergarten children 
                                                        
34 Id. 
35 Bd. of Health, N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§81.08 
36 Bd. of Health, N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§81.50) to Article 81 of 
the New York City Health Code 2 (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-
art81-50.pdf 
37 Id.  
38 Flegal KM, Carroll MD, Ogden CL, Johnson CL. Prevalence and trends in obesity among U.S. adults, 1999-2000. JAMA 2002; 
288:1723- 1727. 
39 “One in 6 New York City Adults is Obese.” NYC Vital Signs. NYCDOHMH. 2003. 2(7). 
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suffering from obesity.
40
 Because it is well established that individuals who are overweight are at 
increased risk for diabetes, heart disease, stroke, high blood pressure, arthritis, and cancer, the 
Board declared obesity a substantial public health concern. 
  The Board’s primary concern is “away from home’ food consumption.” 41 It is estimated 
that New York City’s residents consume approximately one third of daily caloric intake from 
foods purchased and prepared outside of the home, and this proportion is increasing.
42
 Studies 
show that Americans as a whole are increasingly consuming meals outside of the home. In 1970, 
Americans spent on average 26% of money allocated for meals on foods prepared outside their 
homes, including restaurants, fast food chains, delicatessens, and food stands.
43
 Comparatively, 
by 2006 Americans spent almost half, roughly 48%, of their money allocated for meals on food 
made outside the home.
44
 As a result, New York City officials have determined that the need for 
informed choice is required now more than ever.   
 New York officials primarily rely on the contrast between products that are for sale in 
grocery stores, to products consumed in food service establishments. Currently it is federally 
mandated that products for sale in a supermarkets, grocery stores, and convenience stores display 
adequate nutritional labels.
45
 This allows for consumers to make informed decisions based on 
specific criteria such as caloric information and fat content. However, in contrast, consumers 
lack essential information to make healthy choices when eating in restaurants.
46
 The Board of 
Health determined that if caloric information was provided at the time of food selection, New 
                                                        
40 “Obesity in Early Childhood: More than 40% of Head Start Children in NYC are Overweight or Obese.” NYC Vital Signs. 
NYCDOHMH. 2006. 5(2). 
41 Bd. of Health, N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§81.50) 
42 Id.  
43 Guthrie JF. et al. Role of Food Prepared Away from Home in the American Diet, 1977-78 Versus 1994-96: Changes and 
Consequences. Society for Nutrition Education 2002; 34:140-150. 
44 Id. 
45 US Department of Health and Human Services (US DHHS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for 
Health Statistics. Healthy People 2000 Final Review. 2001. 
46 Id. 
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Yorkers would not only be allowed to make more informed choices, but are likely to choose a 
healthier option.
47
 Accordingly, Article 81 of the New York City Health Code was amended to 
require that information on calorie content of menu items be available to patrons of food service 
establishments at the time of ordering when such information is otherwise made publicly 
available by or on behalf of the food service establishment.
48
 
Overview of Soda Ban 
 On March 16
th
 2013 New York City will officially place a ban on the sale of sugary 
drinks.
49
 Also known as Amendment § 81.53 to Article 81 of the New York City Health Code, 
the ban was established as another proposed intervention to the ever-growing problem of obesity. 
It has been reported that more than half of New York City adults, estimated at fifty eight percent, 
are now overweight or obese.
50
 In comparison 35.9% of adults nation-wide suffer from obesity, 
and 33.3% who are classified as overweight.
51
 Not only is the average New Yorker overweight at 
a higher rate than the national average, it is estimated that more than 20% of the City’s public 
school children (K-8) are obese.
52
 Comparatively, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
report that 18% of all children from ages 6 to 11 suffer from obesity. 
53
 
 The New York City legislature provided significant findings in support of the sugary drink 
ban. Today it is estimated that Americans consume 200-300 more calories daily than 30 years 
ago.
54
 The precipitating cause is being attributed to increased consumption of sugary drinks.
55
 
                                                        
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Legal challenges to New York Sugary drink ban may fail. Inside Counsel. June 5, 2012. Seen at: 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/06/05/legal-challenges-to-new-york-sugary-drink-ban-may?page=2  
50 New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Community Health Survey 2010. 
51 Id. 
52 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Obesity in K-8 students – New York City, 2006-07 to 2010-11 school years. Morbidity 
and Mortality Weekly Report 2011; 60(49): 1673-78. 
53 Id. 
54 Olshansky SJ, Passaro DJ, Hershow RC, Layden J, Carnes BA, Brody J, Hayflick L, Butler RN, Allison DB, Ludwig DS. A potential 
decline in life expectancy in the United States in the 21st century. New England Journal of Medicine 2005; 352(11): 1138-45. 
55 Id. 
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Studies indicate that a 20-ounce sugary drink can contain the equivalent of 16 packets of sugar.
56
 
These drinks have been associated with long-term weight gain among both adults and children.
57
 
Major concerns have surfaced surrounding the health of today’s youth. Scientists predict, with 
every additional sugary beverage a child drinks daily, a child’s odds of becoming obese increase 
by 60%.
58
 With this, major concerns, such as juvenile diabetes, are more prominent today than 
ever. 
 Food service establishments are an important source of daily food intake for New York 
City residents. It is estimated that one third of daily caloric intake of the city’s residents comes 
from foods purchased in restaurants.
59
 The consumption of sugary drinks among New York City 
residents has created concern from a public health prospective. It is estimated that more than 
30% of adult New Yorkers report drinking one or more sugary drink per day.
60
 While these rates 
raise concern, the rates are considerably higher in, low-income communities and among youths. 
For example, residents in low-income neighborhoods report drinking 4 or more sugary drinks 
daily.
61
 Comparatively, youth are consuming sugary drinks in even larger quantities. In 2009, 
44% of NYC children aged 6 to 12 years consumed more than 1 sugary drink per day.
62
 
Similarly, 26% of public high school students consumed 2 or more sugary drinks per day in the 
last week.
63
 
 Fast food chains have adopted a clear strategy that is best characterized as “more bang for 
                                                        
56 Guthrie JF, Morton JF. Food sources of added sweeteners in the diets of Americans. Journal of the American Dietetic Association 
2000; 100:43-51. 
57 Malik VS, Schulze MB, Hu FB. Intake of sugar-sweetened beverages and weight gain: A systematic review. American Journal of 
Clinical Nutrition 2006; 84:274-88. 
58 Ludwig DS, Peterson KE, Gortmaker SL. Relation between consumption of sugar-sweetened drinks and childhood obesity: A 
prospective, observational analysis. Lancet 2001; 357:505-8. 
59 Bd. of Health, N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§81.53) to Article 81 of 
the New York City Health Code (2012), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/notice/2012/amend-food-
establishments.pdf 
60 New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Community Health Survey 2010. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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your buck.” Recent trends indicate that increased portion sizes have had a direct effect on the 
prevalence of obesity in our nation. 
64
 Moreover, as portion sizes increased in fast food chains, so 
have the bottling and portion sizes of soft drinks. For instance, the original Coca-Cola bottle size 
was 6.5 fluid ounces; whereas today the standard is 12-16 fluid oz.
65
 Fountain drinks are also a 
growing concern. The soda sizes at McDonald’s have increased a staggering 457% since 1955, 
from 7 fluid ounces to 32 fluid ounces.
66
 
 While fast food chains do contribute to the growing health problems, they are not the sole 
cause. Some restaurants in New York City offer individual drink sizes up to 64 fluid ounces. It 
has been estimated that a sugary drink this size contains 780 calories and 54 teaspoons of sugar, 
and no nutrients.
67
 Logically, larger portions lead to increased consumption and calorie intake.
68
 
It has been shown that when individuals are given larger portions, they unknowingly consume 
more while at the same time do not experience an increased sense of fullness. In one study in 
particular, people who consumed soup from self-refilling bowls ate 73% more than those who 
had to manually refill, without perceiving that they felt fuller or had eaten more.
69
 New York 
health officials feel the same holds true with beverages. They conclude that when served more 
fluid ounces of a beverage, people will inevitably drink more without decreasing the amount of 
food they eat or experiencing a difference in “fullness” or thirst.70 
 Amendment § 81.53 was ultimately proposed to address the obesity epidemic among New 
York Cities residents. By limiting the maximum size of sugary beverages sold in food service 
                                                        
64 Young LR, Nestle M. The contribution of expanding portion sizes to the US obesity epidemic. American Journal of Public Health 
2002; 92(2):246-49. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Retrieved on November 22, 2012 from: http://nutrition.mcdonalds.com/getnutrition/nutritionfacts.pdf. 
68 Wansink B, Painter JE, North J. Bottomless bowls: Why visual cues of portion size may influence intake. Obesity Research 2005; 
13(1): 93-100. 
69 Wansink B et al. (2005) 
70 Id. 
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establishments, the goal is to reduce the adverse effects of overconsumption.
71
 Section 81.53 
includes a ban on all sugar sweetened drinks over sixteen ounces sold or provided in restaurants, 
fast food chains, movie theaters, sports stadiums, and food carts.
72
 The ban is designed to reach 
all types of sugary drinks, including beverages such as coffee, energy drinks, and pre-sweetened 
iced teas. However, diet sodas, fruit juices, dairy-based milkshakes, and alcoholic beverages 
would not be affected.
73
 Moreover, the amendment sets a maximum size for self-service cups at 
not more than 16 fluid ounces. Failure to comply with the regulation carries a punishment of no 
more than two hundred dollars for each violation as described in the proposed rule.
74
  
Constitutional Challenges to Trans Fat Regulation 
 
Currently, there have been no constitutional challenges to New York City’s ban on trans 
fat; however, legal scholars have hypothesized the potential challenges to the regulation. The 
main theories are: 1. The trans fat ban is preempted by federal law; 2. The amendment violates 
the Dormant Commerce Clause because of its burden on interstate commerce; and 3. The 
restriction of trans fats violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  
A. Preemption Challenge 
Preemption is the ability of Federal laws and regulation to prevent or prohibit the actions 
of a lower level government.
75
 In the United State Constitution, the Supremacy Clause explicitly 
states that Federal law is the “supreme law of the land.”76 Expanding on the text, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Supremacy Clause to unequivocally grant Congress and federal 
                                                        
71 Bd. of Health, N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§81.53) 
72 Legal challenges to New York Sugary drink ban may fail. Inside Counsel. June 5, 2012. Seen at: 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/06/05/legal-challenges-to-new-york-sugary-drink-ban-may?page=2 
73 Id. 
74 Bd. of Health, N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§81.08) 
75 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317 (2001) 
76 U.S. CONST. ART. VI. 
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agencies the power to preempt local laws on the same subject.
77
 Conversely, the Court has 
declared that traditional state functions are those, which deal with public health, safety, and 
welfare.
78
 These state functions have been classified as being within the police powers of a 
state.
79
 Legal scholars suggest the core of the preemption challenge would stem from the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938.
80
 Under the Food Drug and Cosmetic act, trans fats are 
generally recognized as safe, with the only requirement being fat content disclosed on the 
nutritional label.
81
 Theoretically, a challenger could posit that, because the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938 expressly states that the only requirement for trans fats is labeling 
disclosure, any further regulation would be an overreach of a state’s power. State and local 
governments are free to set and enforce more rigorous standards than those delineated by the 
federal government.
82
 Federal laws are essentially viewed as a floor, meaning they set the 
minimum requirements to which a state must adhere. However, a state is free to raise the ceiling 
as high as they would like, as long as it does not substantially frustrate the purpose of federal 
law. In analyzing the trans fat ban, it is unlikely that a court would determine the New York City 
regulation frustrates the purpose of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938. The Act was 
established as a response to the deceptive practices in the late 1920’s-1930’s, which contributed 
to the great depression.
83
 The Act’s hopes were that by ensuring consumers were not defrauded 
or misinformed; the government could regain public trust in business.
84
 It is likely that a court 
would determine that the purpose of the New York City regulation only expands on the 
foundations of the FDCA. By banning trans fat in food service establishments, consumers are 
                                                        
77 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317 (2001 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  
81 Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, P. L. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). 
82 CHEMERINSKY 
83 Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, P. L. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). 
84 Id.  
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further protected from ingesting potential harmful oils, which are used in a considerable amount 
of products and product preparation.   
B. Challenge under the Dorman Commerce Clause  
  The Dormant Commerce clause is a concept that has been judicially created by the 
Supreme Court through decades of jurisprudence. The Dormant Commerce Clause gets its 
powers directly from the enumerated powers granted within the Commerce Clause, which is 
included in Article 1 section 8 of the United States Constitution.
85
 The Commerce clause grants 
the federal government the power to regulate trade between states.
86
 In expanding on the 
enumerated language, the Supreme Court’s development of the Dormant Commerce Clause has 
allowed Congress to regulate (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities 
used in interstate commerce; (3) and those things which would substantially affect interstate 
commerce.
87
 
 With the broadening of the Commerce Clause, when applying the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, the Court has adopted a systematic approach in analyzing the constitutionality of state 
and local laws. The first step in the analysis requires there to be a state action.
88
 It is clear that a 
court would determine there has been a state action on the part of New York City. Because this is 
a piece of legislation, proposed by the government, enacted and enforced by government 
agencies, the court will unquestionably determine there has been a state action. Once the Court 
determines there is a state action, the next question is whether the state or local legislation is 
facially discriminatory.
89
 A piece of legislation is facially discriminatory when, in the express 
text of the law, its purpose clearly discriminates against out-of-staters, either by burdening out-
                                                        
85 CHEMERINSKY 
86 Id. 310 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317 (2001) 
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of-staters or unfairly advantaging in-staters.”90 This step is arguably the most crucial element of 
a court’s analysis. Facially discriminatory laws are subject to a virtually per se rule of 
invalidity.
91
 The Court has firmly declared that it applies the “strictest scrutiny” in facially 
discriminatory cases.
92
 In order for a state or local government to survive strict scrutiny, the 
discriminatory law will only be upheld if it is proven by the government that the law is necessary 
to achieve a compelling government purpose, and the means to achieving that end are narrowly 
tailored.
93
 State laws may also violate the dormant Commerce Clause with statutes that are 
facially neutral. Here, the court does not decide whether the actual text of the legislation 
discriminates, but rather if its purpose was discriminatory or is discriminatory in its effect.
94
 In 
looking at the discriminatory purpose or effect the Supreme Court has developed a balancing 
test.
95
 In Pike, the Supreme Court determined that when a statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld, unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the local benefits.”96 In other words, if the burden from a state law exceeds the 
benefits from that law, the law will be struck down. This balancing test provides the courts with 
a great deal of discretion in their analysis of nondiscriminatory dormant Commerce Clause 
cases.
97
 Unlike facially discriminatory laws, the courts generally uphold nondiscriminatory 
laws.
98
  
 Challengers to the trans fat ban would ultimately contend that the court should analyze the 
law under strict scrutiny; however, there is nothing in the text of Amendment § 81.08, which 
                                                        
90 Id. at 318 
91 Id.   
92 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Chemerinsky, supra note 95, at 299-300 
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 301 
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appears to discriminate against out-of-staters while favoring in-state residents. The regulation 
prohibits all food containing artificial trans fat from being served in all restaurants within city 
limits, regardless of their geographic origin.
99
 Therefore, because the law is not facially 
discriminatory, the court is unlikely to apply strict-scrutiny. It is less clear whether the trans fat 
ban would survive a contention that even though the regulation is not facially discriminatory, it 
has either a discriminatory effect or purpose. A challenger’s likely argument would be that the 
trans fat regulation is discriminatory in its effect. It could be argued that banning trans fats could 
discriminate against the mass production used by many chain restaurants. Because the 
foundations of a chain restaurant are consistency, a ban of trans fat in New York City could 
potentially yield a change in their product. For example, McDonald prides itself that a french fry 
or a Big Mac in Massachusetts tastes the same as a Big Mac or french fries in London. Because 
chains such as McDonalds prepares and cooks the majority of food items using trans fats, they 
could contend that a Big Mac or french fry in New York City wouldn’t taste the same as a Big 
Mac or french fry across the Hudson river in New Jersey. Moreover, it could be asserted that the 
use of trans fats is more economically viable for mass production. In requiring the use of other 
oils, not only would it increase the costs of preparation and products in general, but a company 
who mass produces would have to specially prepare foods just for New York City, which would 
result in a substantial burden for outside companies. This argument is likely to be a challenger’s 
best argument. By showing that an outside corporation would have to produce special products 
just to ship into New York City, a flourishing market for consumerism, one can claim this 
legislation has a discriminatory effect. Further, a challenger would contest that companies that 
produce goods directly in New York City are being unfairly advantaged, because their 
production could simply be ridden of trans fat all together and still produce a uniform product. 
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The court would likely analyze this contention by applying the Pike balancing test. The standard 
for the Pike test analyzes whether a statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld, 
unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits.
100
 It 
seems unlikely that a court would interpret the effect of the New York City regulation as being 
clearly excessive in the face of the ever-growing epidemic of obesity. New York City officials 
could contends that since the regulation was passed as a response to a serious public health 
concern, the local benefits are overwhelming. A court is likely to determine that the legislative 
intent is to slow down the rise in overweight and obese individuals, and that this intent is a very 
compelling state interest. Further the court is likely to determine that the effects on interstate 
commerce are merely incidental. There is no evidence from the legislative findings, and nothing 
expressly stated in the regulation itself that is evidence of any type of discrimination. It is evident 
that anytime a state or local ordinance is passed that restricts anything in a commercial setting, 
there will be a corporation somewhere in the United States, or outside the country, that will 
experience some form of burden. Because the burdens are merely incidental and the potential 
benefits from the regulation are overwhelming positive, a court is likely to reject this contention.  
C. Violation of 5
th
 Amendment, as a “Taking” 
 The last potential challenge to New York City’s ban of trans fats is that the economic 
impact of the ban on restaurants could constitute a “taking”. The Takings Clause is enumerated 
under the Fifth Amendment and states, “no private property shall be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”101 Over the years, the Supreme Court has refined the Takings Clause into 
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two categories, a physical taking, and a regulatory taking.
102
 A physical taking occurs through 
avenues such as eminent domain, which is the actual taking of land to advance a government 
purpose. In contrast, a regulatory taking occurs when the government regulates private property 
for a public purpose.
103
 Furthermore, a regulatory taking can occur when a government action, 
such as a law or regulation, interferes with an owner’s use of private property. The Supreme 
Court has fashioned a test to examine whether a taking has violated the United States 
Constitution. The test, also known as the Penn Central balancing test, determines whether the 
government action in question regulates the property to such a degree that it denies an owner of 
all economically viable use of the property.
104
 Essentially the Court will balance whether the 
economic impact of the regulation on the business owner outweighs the governments need to 
protect the public through the regulation.  
 It seems likely that the New York City trans fat ban would survive a challenge brought 
under the Takings Clause. A court would likely determine that the regulation does not deprive 
restaurant owners of all economically viable use of their property, rather just a potential loss of 
value in their property. Requiring restaurants and fast food chains to use an alternative to trans 
fat merely requires the food service establishments to use a different type of oil in their 
preparation. The cost of fat free oils are relatively low, but have a slight increase in comparison 
to the more cost effective trans fat. However, simple economic losses through increased costs 
and decreased profits are insufficient to establish a taking. Moreover, the court is likely to weigh 
the benefits of public health against the costs imposed on the food service establishments. One 
important element in this distinction is that the trans fat ban is all encompassing. The ban applies 
to all food service establishments evenly. Therefore, all food service industries are required to 
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bear the same burden, the same costs, and the same potential economic loss. This even-
handedness merely solidifies a courts likely determination that the public health benefits far 
exceed a potential economic burden.  
Constitutional Challenges to Menu Label Regulation 
On January 22, 2008 New York City adopted § 81.50 to Amendment 81, which required 
all food service establishments to disclose the caloric contents on their menus.
105
 Major 
challenges to the New York City regulation have been brought under the First Amendment as 
violating freedom of speech.
106
  In order for a menu label law to be considered legal, the Court 
must consider each step of the First Amendment analysis. First, menus and menu boards much 
be considered a form of commercial speech.
107
 Second, the menu label laws must be a form of 
commercial disclosure, a requirement mandating the disclosure of factual information, and lastly, 
the menu label laws must pass a reasonable basis test.
108
 
A. First Amendment  
The First Amendment explicitly states the “Congress shall make no law abridging the 
freedom of speech.”109 While it is generally thought that freedom of speech applies only to 
individual rights, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment as 
encompassing a protection of commercial speech.
110
 In the landmark case of Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court expanded the general interpretation of the First 
Amendment and held that the First Amendment protects speech that “does no more than propose 
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a commercial transaction.”111 As a result, the Supreme Court’s interpretation expanded the 
application of the First Amendment to commercial transactions. It is very likely that a court 
would find that menus are a form of commercial speech. Menus primary function is to propose to 
consumers a commercial transaction. A court however could potentially distinguish menus and 
menu boards as falling outside the spectrum of commercial speech because menus are not 
generally viewed as advertisement. However, for the purpose of analysis it is reasonable to 
conclude that menus could be classified as a form of commercial speech. 
Historically, First Amendment analyses have been generally broken into two sub-
categories, traditional speech and commercial speech.
112
 Traditional speech is based on the 
principals that individuals in general have the right to speak or refrain from speaking.
113
 While 
the application of traditional speech does not align itself with challenges to the New York City 
regulation, an application of compelled commercial disclosure is the foundation of challenger’s 
argument. These cases generally involve deceptive speech in commercial settings.
114
 In such 
cases as Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the United 
State Supreme Court explained that “advertising by professionals possesses special risks of 
deception, because the public lacks sophistication.” 115 The right to be free from compelled 
speech is a somewhat murky area of jurisprudence. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court explained 
that it may be appropriate to require a commercial message to appear in such a form, or include 
additional information, warnings, or disclaimers as are necessary to prevent it from being 
deceptive.
116
 Commercial disclosure requirements however are a routine part of the regulatory 
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scheme in the United States. In 1966, Congress enacted the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act. 
The Act states: 
Informed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient functioning of a free 
market economy. Packaging and their labels should enable consumers to obtain 
accurate information as to the quantity of the contents and should facilitate value 
comparisons. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to 
assist consumers and manufactures in reaching these goals in the marketing of 
consumer goods.
117
  
 
 As a result of the Courts interpretation, legislative intervention requiring commercial disclosures 
has been extended to First Amendment protections. Opponents of the menu label laws are likely 
to attack this analysis based on the contention that menu label laws require a food service 
establishment to voice a point of view with which they disagree, or that they do not want to 
disclose. A court is likely to reject this contention because the menu label laws require a factual 
disclosure of caloric information. While a challenger may not agree with displaying the 
information, a food service establishment would not be able to contend the caloric information is 
inaccurate. New York City’s menu label law merely compels the disclosure of factual and 
uncontroversial commercial information.  
 The third and final step in analyzing compelled commercial speech is application of a 
rational basis review. A Courts analysis under rational basis simply asks whether the piece of 
legislation is rationally related to a reasonable state interest.
118
 The application of this test has 
historically been fatal to the party challenging the legislature. It is clear that New York City has a 
substantial interest in the promotion of public health. Further, as a result of the increased number 
of overweight and obese population in New York City, informed consumption is a reasonable 
means to achieving their goal. The legislature and public health department have discovered 
considerable findings, which directly correlate an increased consumption by New York City 
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residents at food service establishments, with a rise in obesity. This correlation triggered a 
substantial need for government intervention. A challenger’s best contention to combat the 
rational basis test is whether targeting calories is reasonably related to the state’s interest. 
Experts consider calorie consumption to be the single most important indicator for weight loss 
and gain.
119
 It would clearly be unreasonable to compel food service establishments to disclose 
every line of nutritional information as is required on packaged food. Therefore it is fair to say 
that a court would conclude that the menu label laws have a rational relationship to the 
government’s interest in the promotion of public health.  
Constitutional Challenges to Soda Ban 
 
 Since the passage of the Amendment § 81.53 (“Soda ban”) by New York City, no 
challenges have been brought forward.
120
 The ban does not take into effect until March 16
th
 
2013; however, many legal scholars predict a considerable amount of federal constitutional 
challenges will be brought forward.
121
  Ironically, legal scholars predict that these challenges 
would be brought not from individual citizens who feel their rights have been violated, but rather 
by major companies like Coca-Cola Co, PepsiCo Inc., and Dr. Pepper Snapple Group Inc. 
122
 
Legal scholars predict corporations will likely rely on two federal constitutional challenges. First, 
the soda ban has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, thus violating the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. Second, by regulating the size of only sugary drinks, as opposed to all drinks, 
the soda ban violate a company’s equal protection rights. 
A. Dormant Commerce Clause 
 The modern Dormant Commerce Clause approach has abandoned the rigid, bright-line 
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tests of the past in favor of a more flexible approach.
123
 Generally stated, “State regulation 
affecting interstate commerce will be upheld if (a) the regulation is rationally related to a 
legitimate state end, and (b) the regulatory burden imposed on interstate commerce, and any 
discrimination against it, are outweighed by the state interest in enforcing the regulation.”124 
Therefore, the first step in the analysis of whether the dormant commerce clause is applicable 
requires a state action. It is clear when looking at the soda ban, as with the challenges to the trans 
fat ban, there is a clear state action. The legislation enacted, passed, and enforced the regulation; 
therefore, a court would easily determine that there is a state action. After the court determines 
there is a state action, the next question is whether the state or local legislation is facially 
discriminatory.
125
 Facially discriminatory has been classified as when a state law in the explicit 
text of the law unfairly discriminates against out-of-staters .
126
 This step is arguably the most 
important element of a courts analysis. Facially discriminatory laws are subject to a virtually per 
se rule of invalidity.
127
 The Court has firmly declared that it will employ the “strictest scrutiny” 
in facially discriminatory cases.
128
 In order for a state or local government to survive strict 
scrutiny, the government bears the burden of proof that the law is necessary to achieve a 
compelling government purpose; and the means to achieving that end are narrowly tailored.
129
 In 
applying the soda ban, there is nothing in the text that would trigger strict scrutiny. The text of 
the soda ban even-handedly applies within and outside New York City. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to conclude that a court would not apply strict scrutiny. 
 State laws can also violate the Dormant Commerce Clause that are facially neutral with 
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respect to out-of-staters, but have a discriminatory effect or a discriminatory purpose.
130
 In 
looking at the discriminatory effect or purpose the Courts have developed a balancing test. 
131
 In 
Pike, the Supreme Court determined that where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate 
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it 
will be upheld, unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
local benefits.
132
 Unlike facially discriminatory laws, the courts generally uphold 
nondiscriminatory laws.
133
  
 Challengers to the soda ban are likely to have the best chance of success contending that 
the soda ban is discriminatory in effect. Major companies like Coca Cola and Pepsi could 
contend that, when manufacturing their product, the New York City ban in excess of 16 ounces 
discriminates against the industry standard bottling of 20 ounces. As a result of New York City’s 
expansive market, manufacturers would have to bottle their products in accordance with the 16-
ounce regulation, to be permitted to ship within the city limits. A court could potentially 
determine that this contention is very persuasive. One possible contrast is that these major 
corporations are not limited to shipping any of their products within New York City to grocery or 
convenience stores. It is unclear on exactly how a court would interpret a contention like this. 
New York City is very well known for a having a substantial number of delicatessens, fast food 
chains, pizza places, and street carts. In almost all of these places, there is the availability of the 
industry standard 20-ounce soda. By requiring a major company to manufacture bottles 
specifically for New York City food service establishments, could be viewed as an excessive 
burden. Therefore, there are potential considerations for the court to weigh. In applying these 
burdens to the Pike test, a court must determine if the regulation even-handedly effectuates a 
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legitimate local public interest, and if that interest outweighs the burdens placed on interstate 
commerce.
134
 A court’s analysis of the regulation would most likely reveal that all manufacturers 
are being treated equally. One would conclude that there are no New York City manufacturers 
who would gain any material benefit from the regulation. Rather they too would have to 
specially produce bottles for the New York City market, which would be different from those 
shipped outside of the city. In these respects, the court is likely to conclude the regulation is 
even-handed in its effect. It is less clear, however, that a court would outweigh the local public 
interest over the burdens placed on interstate commerce. New York City is the largest city in the 
United States. By restricting the free flow of outside products into New York City, a court could 
very well determine that the public interest does not outweigh the burden. New York City will 
undoubtedly proffer that the rise in obesity is a substantial public health concern, and that state 
and local governments are explicitly granted the power to promote public health and welfare. 
However, historically the United State Supreme Court has been hesitant to allow regulations that 
would restrict the free flow of interstate commerce, where there could be a possible aggregate 
effect. A court could very well conclude that if New York City restricted the size of sugary 
drinks, and every major city followed, manufacturers could suffer such severe economic burdens 
that they would be forced to close. In the event a court concludes that soda ban does violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause due to the 16-ouce restrictions, it is likely that the ban could be 
amended to increase the maximum from 16-ounce to 20-ounces to conform with industry 
standards. This possible settlement, would likely eliminate any corporations from challenging the 
constitutionality of the soda ban.  
B. Equal Protection  
 The Equal Protection Clause finds its roots in both the 14th amendment and 5
th
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Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. When faced with a state denying equal protection of the 
law to a citizen the application of the 14
th
 Amendment Equal Protection Clause is appropriate. 
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from denying any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
135
In other words, state laws must treat all individuals the same. The 
equal protection clause does not have to provide "equality" among individuals or classes, rather 
only requires equal application of the laws.
136
 In determining whether a violation has occurred, 
the Supreme Court has applied different tests depending on the type of classification and its 
effect on fundamental rights.
137
 Generally, the Court will defer to the states and trust that the law 
is per se valid. The least stringent test that the Court will apply is a rational basis test. The test, 
simply stated, is whether there is a rational basis for the state purpose. The Court, however, 
applies more stringent analyses in cases with “suspect classes”.138 If the law or regulation denies 
equal protection to a suspect classification, the Court will apply strict scrutiny.
139
 Suspect-
classifications occur when there is denials of equal protect based on race, color, and religion.
140
 
Moreover, a violation of a fundamental right, such as a law that restricts speech, will also trigger 
the Courts analysis under strict scrutiny.
141
 In order for a law or regulation to survive strict 
scrutiny the government must prove that there is a compelling purpose for the government 
interest in passing the law or regulation, and the means to achieving the end is narrowly 
tailored.
142
 
The foundation of a challenger’s contention is that by requiring only food service 
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establishments to be subject to the soda ban, while leaving grocery stores and convenience stores 
exempt, violates equal protection of the law. It is unlikely that the court will determine the soda 
ban targets suspect classes by any means. There are no restrictions to fundamental rights, and the 
regulation does not discriminate against any single class of person. Therefore, applying strict 
scrutiny would not be prudent. A court will likely analyze the regulation using a rational basis 
standard. As previously mentioned, rational basis is almost always fatal to the challenging party 
because courts generally defer to legislatures, without questioning their basis for enacting laws. 
However, the challenging party could make a strong argument that there is no reasonable 
relationship between restricting only food service establishments and leaving people the choice 
to buy the same product from a grocery store. This contention, while compelling, is likely to be 
throw out by the court. The means to achieving an end do not have to be narrowly tailored in the 
application of a rational basis standard. The only thing required is the government must present 
some reasonable reason for the adoption of the soda ban. It is clear that the government would 
offer evidence of the obesity epidemic and the potential health hazards linked with overly sugary 
drinks. It is fair to conclude that the court would deem this reason to be reasonable, thus 
upholding the constitutionality of the regulation as being in line with the 14
th
 Amendment.  
Conclusion 
 With New York City, a prominent government at the forefront of public health 
intervention, it is likely than many jurisdictions throughout the United States will adopt similar 
regulations, laws and ordinances to combat the ever rising epidemic of obesity. While many 
challenges will likely result from these regulations, the growing concerns from a public health 
standpoint are insurmountable. It is clear that government intervention, as illustrated in New 
York City, is not only a proper exercise of governmental rights, but would be determined by a 
 27 
court to be a constitutional response to a growing health concern. Regardless of the law, 
regulation or ordinance, particular individuals, groups, organizations will feel as though their 
rights are being restricted. However, when faced with substantial interests, such as public health, 
safety and welfare, the government should and will be granted a considerable amount of 
deference in their response.  
 
